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Part One: Social Network Providers, Representatives and the Legal Framework

Introduction

The concept of a Social Media Platform (SMP) was introduced into Turkish law for the first time through amendments to Law No. 5651, enacted via Law No. 7253 on 29 July 2020 and published on the Official Gazette on 31 July 2020.1 Under this regulation, a social media platform is defined as “real or legal persons that enable users to create, view, or share content such as text, images, audio, and location in the Internet environment for the purpose of social interaction.”2 This definition was further refined by Law No. 7418 on 13 October 2022.

On 29 July 2020, Article 6 of Law No. 7253 introduced Supplemental Article 4 to Law No. 5651, establishing a concrete framework of liability. Although the regulation primarily targets foreign-sourced platforms, domestic platforms with more than one million daily accesses from Türkiye also fall within its scope.

The primary obligation for foreign-sourced platforms exceeding this one-million-user threshold is the appointment of at least one authorised representative in Türkiye. This representative serves as the point of contact for fulfilling notifications and requests issued by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK), the Association of Access Providers (ESB), or judicial and administrative authorities. They are also responsible for responding to individual applications and fulfilling all other obligations mandated by the Law.3

Crucially, if the representative is a real person, they must be a Turkish citizen resident in Türkiye. Their contact details must be displayed prominently and be directly accessible on the platform’s website. Following the 2022 amendments (Article 34, Law No. 7418), platforms are now statutorily obliged to notify the BTK of this person’s identity and contact information.

For platforms with a massive footprint, specifically those exceeding ten million daily accesses from Türkiye, the requirements are more stringent. The appointed representative must be fully authorised and liable in technical, administrative, legal, and financial terms. Should this representative be a legal entity, it must be established as a branch in the form of a capital company directly owned by the social media platform.

The Sanctions Regime: A Ladder of Escalation

Provisional Article 5 of Law No. 5651 granted platforms a three-month grace period from 31 July 2020 to comply.4 This window closed on 1 October 2020.

For those failing to notify the BTK of a representative by the deadline, the Law prescribes a graduated system of sanctions, beginning with a formal warning. If the platform remains non-compliant, the penalties escalate as follows:5

  • First Fine (November 2020): Failure to comply within thirty days of the warning triggers an administrative fine of TRY 10 million.

  • Second Fine (December 2020): If the obligation remains unmet thirty days after the first fine, an additional fine of TRY 30 million is imposed.

  • Advertising Ban (January 2021): Should non-compliance persist for a further thirty days, the President of BTK shall prohibit tax-resident real and legal persons in Türkiye from placing new advertisements on the platform. This includes a ban on establishing new contracts or transferring funds for this purpose.

  • Bandwidth Throttling – 50% (April 2021): If the platform does not comply within three months of the advertising ban, the President of BTK may apply to the Criminal Judgeship of Peace to reduce the platform’s Internet traffic bandwidth by fifty per cent.

  • Bandwidth Throttling – 90% (May 2021): If the platform remains defiant thirty days after the first throttling order, a second application may be made to reduce bandwidth by up to ninety per cent. The judge may determine a lower rate, provided it is no less than fifty per cent, taking the nature of the service into account.

However, the Law provides an “exit ramp” and in the case of a platform appointing and notifying a representative during this process, only one-quarter of the imposed fines are collected, the advertising ban is lifted, and any judicial throttling orders automatically become void.

Implementation and Compliance

The enforcement of these regulations triggered a rapid sequence of events in late 2020 and early 2021. VKontakte became the first platform to notify a legal representative in early November 2020. Conversely, on 4 November 2020, the BTK imposed the initial TRY 10 million fine on Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, TikTok, Dailymotion, Periscope,6 and Pinterest. When these platforms failed to comply, they were hit with the secondary TRY 30 million fine on 11 December 2020.

Facing the prospect of advertising bans, the major players began to capitulate. YouTube (16 Dec 2020), TikTok (8 Jan 2021), Dailymotion (9 Jan 2021), LinkedIn (16 Jan 2021), and Facebook/Instagram (18 Jan 2021) all notified the BTK of their intent to establish legal representation.7

For the holdouts, Twitter, Periscope, and Pinterest, an advertising ban was officially imposed on 19 January 2021.8 This pressure eventually yielded results; Twitter announced its compliance on 19 March 2021, followed by Pinterest on 9 April 2021. Consequently, the BTK lifted the advertising bans for Pinterest9 (11 April 2021) and Twitter10 (24 April 2021).

To date, the ultimate sanction of bandwidth throttling has never been applied to any social media platform. The current landscape of legal entities established in Türkiye is as follows:

  • LinkedIn: 17 November 202011

  • Google (YouTube): 12 January 202112

  • TikTok: 29 February 202113

  • X (formerly Twitter): 22 April 202114

  • Pinterest: 13 July 202115

  • Meta (Facebook & Instagram): 14 July 202116

Both Dailymotion and VKontakte have opted to be represented by real persons.17

Finally, regarding the legal challenge mounted by the main opposition party against the 2020 regulations, the Constitutional Court ruled that the request for annulment was rendered moot, given the subsequent amendments introduced by Article 34 of Law No. 7418. 18 A constitutional review of the 2022 amendments is currently ongoing.

On 1 April 2023, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) published a pivotal decision in the Official Gazette,19 updating the Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms. This regulation introduced a detailed framework governing how Social Media Platforms (“SMPs”) must structure their representation in Türkiye.

While the regulation permits representation by either a real person or a legal entity,20 the requirements for the latter are stringent. If a platform opts for a corporate representative, it must be a legal entity established under Turkish legislation,21 structured specifically as a branch in the form of a capital company.22

For foreign-based platforms with more than ten million daily accesses from Türkiye, the bar is set even higher. To satisfy the structural conditions laid out in the regulation,23 the representative entity must meet the following criteria:

  • i. Distinctive Trade Name: The company’s trade name must include both the platform’s distinctive brand and the city of its establishment.

  • ii. Full Ownership: All shares in the company must be owned by the Social Media Platform.

  • iii. Explicit Dependency: The articles of association must clearly state that the entity forms part of the Social Media Platform and operates as a dependent subsidiary.

  • iv. Minimum Capital: The company must be established with a registered capital of at least 100 million Turkish Liras.

  • v. Full Liability: The agreement must explicitly declare that the entity is fully authorised and held liable by the Social Media Platform in all technical, administrative, legal, and financial matters.

In this section, we evaluate whether the major foreign-sourced platforms that have established legal entity representatives in Türkiye, namely X (formerly Twitter), Meta (Facebook & Instagram), Google (YouTube), TikTok, LinkedIn, and Pinterest actually satisfy these rigorous structural conditions.

Table 1 examines the capital companies established by these platforms against the specific criteria set out in Article 5 of the Procedures and Principles.24 It assesses whether they possess the necessary qualifications to be legally recognised as a branch under the new regime.

Platform Trade Name
Condition		 Wholly
Owned?		 Explicit
Affiliation		 Capital
(TRY 100M)		 Full Liability
& Authority		 RESULT
Pinterest Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COMPLIANT
X (Twitter) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COMPLIANT
TikTok Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes COMPLIANT
Google
(YouTube)		 No Yes Yes Yes Yes PARTIALLY
COMPLIANT
Meta
(Facebook/
Instagram)		 No Yes Yes Yes Yes PARTIALLY
COMPLIANT
LinkedIn25 No No No No No NON-
COMPLIANT
Table 1: Social Media Platform Capital Company Compliance Assessment

As illustrated in Table 1, full compliance with the conditions set out in Article 5 of the Procedures and Principles has been achieved only by TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), and Pinterest.

Meta and YouTube, by contrast, meet these conditions only partially. Crucially, they fail to include the distinctive brand of the social media platform in the trade names of their local capital companies. Specifically, “YouTube” is absent from the title of the entity established by Google, just as “Facebook” and “Instagram” are missing from the company established by Meta.

The situation with LinkedIn is starker. The representative company originally established in Türkiye on its behalf met none of the conditions specified in Article 5. However, as detailed in the second part of this study, LinkedIn abandoned the legal entity model in 2025, switching instead to representation by a “real person”.

Table 2 provides a comprehensive assessment covering all foreign-based social media platforms. As noted previously, VKontakte and Dailymotion fulfil their obligations through real-person representatives and have not established capital companies in Türkiye.

Social Media Platform Representative
Requirement		 Explanation
VKontakte Real Person
Google (YouTube) Partially Meets Distinctive mark of SMP not used in Title
TikTok Meets
Dailymotion Real Person
Pinterest Meets
Meta (Facebook/
Instagram)		 Partially Meets Distinctive mark of SMP not used in Title
X/Twitter Meets
LinkedIn Does Not Meet None of the structural conditions are met
Table 2: Assessment of SMP Representative Requirement

This provision lays bare a deliberate strategy of institutional tightening and localisation imposed on SMPs operating in Türkiye. The requirement to establish a branch as a capital company is far more than a mere technical regulation; it is a political instrument of pressure, designed to ramp up administrative control and render the activities of these platforms directly auditable.

As illustrated in Table 1, full compliance is the exception rather than the rule, achieved only by TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), and Pinterest. Meta and Google (YouTube) fall short, failing to stamp their trade names with the platform’s distinctive brand, while LinkedIn meets none of the specified conditions. Such disparities mark and breed inequality and arbitrariness in enforcement. Indeed, this fragmented and unpredictable landscape fuels the criticism that these obligations serve as instruments of political compliance rather than technical standards.

The ultimate objective of this model is clear: to expose platforms to rapid and effective sanctions, ranging from administrative fines and advertising bans to bandwidth throttling. By defining corporate structures with such rigid precision, the regulation creates serious risks for freedom of expression and the right to information, leaving SMPs increasingly fragile and susceptible to local pressures. In this respect, the regulation signals the construction of a digital control regime, one that prioritises obedience over transparency and accountability.

The Obligation to Respond and Provide Justifications

A cornerstone of the regime imposed on social media platforms in Türkiye is the requirement to handle user complaints with both speed and efficacy. Under Articles 9 and 9/A of Law No. 5651, platforms are mandated to respond to complaints regarding violations of personal rights or privacy within a strict 48-hour window. Crucially, the law dictates that any rejection of such requests must be accompanied by a statement of reasons.26

To facilitate this, platforms must establish user-friendly mechanisms that allow applications to be submitted and answered directly in Turkish.27 The penalties for non-compliance are severe as the President of the BTK is authorised to impose administrative fines of up to five million Turkish Liras.28 These sanctions may be applied to individual breaches or based on a systemic evaluation of a platform’s performance over a reporting period. The BTK assesses compliance against four key criteria:

  • i. The establishment of the necessary infrastructure for application systems;

  • ii. Evidence of systematic policies to issue negative responses to specific individuals or institutions;

  • iii. Systematic failure to meet the 48-hour deadline;

  • iv. The issuance of negative responses without providing justifications.

While ostensibly designed to protect user rights, these regulations effectively lubricate the machinery of censorship. In practice, they facilitate the rapid removal of critical and dissident content. The 48-hour deadline precludes meaningful legal review, making it virtually impossible for the platforms to conduct in-depth assessments of complaints. This engineered urgency significantly erodes their capacity to resist censorship demands. Given the systematic pressure on freedom of expression in Türkiye, these obligations function less as consumer protection and more as instruments of administrative censorship.

The Liability Trap

Supplemental Article 4/14, introduced in 2022, established a direct legal liability mechanism for platforms. If a social media platform fails to implement content removal or access blocking within 24 hours of receiving a court order, it becomes liable for any resulting damages. Crucially, this liability arises directly; there is no requirement for the claimant to first file a lawsuit against the content provider.

The chilling effect of this regime was starkly visible during the social unrest of 2025. Article 8/A of Law No. 565129 served as a systematic tool for censorship targeting freedom of expression. Following the detention and arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on 19 March 2025, government efforts to stifle dissent migrated rapidly to the digital sphere. Criminal judgeships of peace in Ankara, Izmir, Mersin, and Istanbul issued lightning-fast decisions blocking access to more than 700 X (formerly Twitter) accounts.

Data from the Freedom of Expression Association’s EngelliWeb project reveals the indiscriminate nature of this crackdown. The blockings extended far beyond accounts directly involved in the protests, targeting student and youth organisations,30 women’s organisations,31 independent journalists, rights defenders, and artists. Collectively, these targeted accounts reached nearly 20 million followers.32

Victims of this digital purge included journalist Erk Acarer (1.2 million followers), the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (181,000 followers), and Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu himself (9.7 million followers).33 Conversely, some blocked accounts possessed fewer than ten followers, or none at all. This disparity reveals that the legal framework has been weaponised to dismantle the space for public debate, silencing everyone from influential public figures to ordinary users.

Platform Complicity

The most alarming aspect of this process was the complicity of the platforms themselves. Bowing to the decisions of the criminal judgeships of peace, X geo-blocked hundreds of accounts, including that of Mayor İmamoğlu rendering them inaccessible from Türkiye. By treating information regarding protests and boycotts as “security risks” and implementing orders with haste, the platforms allowed legal compliance to mutate into a systematic mechanism for suppressing the public’s right to information.

Other giants, such as Meta and TikTok, also struggled to resist censorship demands while operating under the looming threats of bandwidth throttling and crippling fines. As highlighted in a joint open letter dated 8 May 2025, signed by civil society organisations including the Freedom of Expression Association, Meta (Facebook and Instagram) acknowledged in its own assessment reports that it had restricted access to government-critical posts. This included accounts belonging to the LGBTQ+ community and feminist organisations, restricted in line with requests transmitted under Article 8/A.

According to Meta’s 2024 data, Instagram’s compliance rate with content removal requests from Türkiye approached 80%.34 However, the fact that Meta faced administrative fines for refusing specific court orders regarding protest content indicates a complex dynamic. It suggests that while the platform is willing to risk conflict with the administration on specific “red lines”, the platform generally cuts a compliant figure.35

On the TikTok front, the situation paints an even grimmer picture of obedience. With a positive response rate of 91.8% to content removal and access blocking requests from Türkiye in the first half of 2024, TikTok ranks as the global platform most submissive to authoritarian demands.36 This high compliance rate reveals a platform all too ready to sacrifice freedom of expression standards to sustain its market presence, rendering it effectively defenceless against the broadly interpreted “public order” justifications of Article 8/A.

The Constitutional Void

The provision regarding the “obligation to respond to requests” in Supplemental Article 4 aims to deter delays via financial sanctions, holding social media platforms directly responsible for timely execution. However, it simultaneously drives platforms to act with excessive caution. This dynamic creates a risk of over-censorship, leading platforms to implement judicial decisions without question, as observed during the events of 19 March 2025.

It must be remembered that social media platforms bear not only administrative but also legal liability, and this liability exercises a direct impact on user content.

Furthermore, in its 2021 Keskin Kalem Publishing and Trade Inc. and Others pilot judgment,37 the Constitutional Court identified serious structural deficiencies in Article 9 of Law No. 5651 regarding freedom of expression. In line with this finding, the Court annulled the relevant article with its decision in October 2023.38 This annulment entered into force on 10 October 2024. Consequently, content removal and access blocking requests based on violations of personal rights can no longer be filed under Article 9.

Strikingly, however, no updates or amendments have been made to Supplemental Article 4 or the Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms. This inaction creates the possibility of a normatively abolished provision persists in practice. By allowing the de facto implementation of repealed provisions, the administration risks rendering constitutional review entirely ineffective.

Within the scope of the obligation to respond, platforms such as Google (YouTube), TikTok, Dailymotion, LinkedIn, and Meta (Facebook & Instagram) have developed digital forms to receive user applications in compliance with Law No. 5651. However, as clearly demonstrated in Table 3, such forms have yet to be created for X (formerly Twitter), Pinterest, VKontakte, and Ekşi Sözlük.

Social Media
Platform		 Legal
Representation		 Application
Page
VKontakte Real Person
YouTube Legal Entity https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/10280210?hl=tr
Dailymotion Real Person
TikTok Legal Entity https://www.tiktok.com/legal/report/contentremoval?lang=tr
Pinterest Legal Entity https://www.pinterest.com/about/turkey/
Facebook/Instagram Legal Entity https://www.facebook.com/help/118930960130870/
X/Twitter Legal Entity
LinkedIn Real Person39 https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/ask/TURKISH-LAW?lang=tr
Ekşi Sözlük Legal Entity
Table 3: SMP Application Pages

The obligation imposed on platforms to respond and provide grounds has mutated into an administrative weapon. Under the pretext of safeguarding user rights, it compels platforms to police content. Despite the Constitutional Court’s annulment of Article 9, the failure to update relevant sub-regulations has left a legal void, one now being filled by political censorship. This reality demands that social media platforms go beyond mere technical compliance, they must take a definitive stand on fundamental rights and freedoms.

Yet, as Table 3 illustrates, the reality on the ground is stark. X (Twitter), Dailymotion, and VKontakte have flagrantly failed to create any complaint forms for user applications, in direct defiance of Law No. 5651. Pinterest fares little better, its form exists only in English, with no Turkish version available.

This corporate negligence constitutes more than a mere legal violation; it exposes the hollowness of their commitment to users’ rights to petition and complain. It serves as a grim reminder that digital rights in Türkiye are threatened not only by the state’s oppressive apparatus but also by the platforms’ own corporate apathy.

In sum, the findings of this section are unequivocal. Türkiye’s digital control mechanisms are engineered for obedience and erasure, prioritising control over liberty. Faced with this regime, social media platforms too often respond with a stance that is alarmingly passive and inadequate.

  1. Official Gazette, 31.07.2020, No. 31202. ↩

  2. Law No. 5651, Article 2 (s). ↩

  3. Law No. 5651, Supp. Art. 4(1). ↩

  4. Law No. 5651, Provisional Article 5(1)(a). ↩

  5. Law No. 5651, Supp. Art. 4(2). ↩

  6. The Periscope platform service was terminated on 31.03.2021. Therefore, it was not included in the evaluation within the scope of this study. ↩

  7. See https://x.com/ofatihsayan/status/1380454617146925059 ↩

  8. BTK Decision No. 4202, 19.01.2021 (Pinterest); BTK Decision No. 3768, 15.01.2021 (Twitter); BTK Decision No. 3769, 15.01.2021 (Periscope), Official Gazette, 19.01.2021, No. 31369. ↩

  9. BTK Decision No. 25159, 09.04.2021 (Pinterest), Official Gazette, 11.04.2021, No. 31451. ↩

  10. BTK Decision No. 28123, 22.04.2021 (Twitter), Official Gazette, 24.04.2021, No. 31464. ↩

  11. SNPREP Danışmanlık Hizmetleri Anonim Şirketi ↩

  12. Google Bilgi Teknolojileri Limited Şirketi. The title was changed to Google İstanbul Bilgi Teknolojileri Limited Şirketi after 05.05.2023. ↩

  13. TikTok Turkey Dijital Medya ve Reklam Limited Şirketi. The title was changed to TikTok İstanbul Dijital Medya ve Reklam Limited Şirketi after 14.04.2023. Also see https://www.tiktok.com/legal/turkey-social-medialaw-5651?lang=tr (available only to users accessing from Türkiye) ↩

  14. Twitter İnternet İçerik Hizmetleri Limited Şirketi. The title was changed to X İstanbul İnternet İçerik Hizmetleri Limited Şirketi after 25.04.2024. ↩

  15. WRP Turkey Web Tasarım Hizmetleri Limited Şirketi. ↩

  16. Madoka Turkey Bilişim Hizmetleri Limited Şirketi. The title was changed to Meta Platforms İstanbul Bilişim Hizmetleri Limited Şirketi on 14.04.2023. Also see https://www.facebook.com/help/118930960130870/ ↩

  17. For the current list, see https://internet.btk.gov.tr/sosyal-ag-temsilci-rehberi/ ↩

  18. Constitutional Court, Docket No. 2020/76, Decision No. 2023/172, 11.10.2023, O.G. Date-Number: 10.01.2024- 32425, §§ 108-109. ↩

  19. Information and Communication Technologies Board (“BTK”) Decision 2023/DK-İD/119, 28.03.2023, Meeting No: 2023/13, Agenda Item No: 06, O.G. 01.04.2023, No: 32150. ↩

  20. BTK, Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms, Article 4(1). ↩

  21. BTK, Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms, Article 4(3). ↩

  22. BTK, Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms, Article 5(1). ↩

  23. BTK, Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms, Article 5(2). ↩

  24. BTK, Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms, Article 5(2). ↩

  25. LinkedIn later switched to a real-person representative model. ↩

  26. Law No. 5651, Supp. Art. 4(3). ↩

  27. BTK, Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms, Article 26(1). ↩

  28. Law No. 5651, Supp. Art. 4(8). See also BTK, Procedures and Principles Regarding Social Media Platforms, Article 26. ↩

  29. Article 8/A of Law No. 5651 establishes an expedited administrative procedure for the removal of content and/ or blocking of access on grounds such as the right to life, national security, public order, the prevention of crime, or public health. Under this provision, the Presidency or relevant ministries may request the President of BTK to block content; such administrative decisions are executed immediately (within four hours) and submitted to a criminal judgeship of peace for ex-post approval within 24 hours. Crucially, the Constitutional Court of Türkiye, in its pilot judgments Artı Media Gmbh (App. No. 2019/40078, 14.09.2023) and Ahmet Alphan Sabancı and Others (App. No. 2015/13667, 21.11.2023), ruled that Article 8/A structurally violates freedom of expression and press freedom. The Court held that the provision fails to meet the criterion of “legality” as it grants the administration excessive discretion without necessary safeguards against arbitrary interference, lacks a graduated intervention mechanism (often blocking entire websites), and denies the defence procedural fairness (equality of arms) by operating as a non-adversarial process. ↩

  30. See EngelliWeb announcement, “Access to X Accounts of Youth Organisations Blocked,” 21.03.2025, https://ifade.org.tr/engelliweb/genclik-orgutlerinin-x-hesaplari-erisime-engellendi/ ↩

  31. See EngelliWeb announcement, “Access Block to Women’s Organisations,” 26.03.2025, https://ifade.org.tr/engelliweb/kadin-orgutlerine-erisim-engeli/ ↩

  32. See EngelliWeb announcement, “Access to X accounts sharing information and content regarding street protests blocked,” 22.03.2025, https://ifade.org.tr/engelliweb/sokak-eylemleriyle-ilgili-bilgi-ve-icerik-paylasan-x-hesaplari-erisime-engellendi/ ↩

  33. Ekrem İmamoğlu’s X account was blocked from access by the decision of the Istanbul 8th Criminal Judgeship of Peace, Decision No. 2025/436, 24.04.2025. ↩

  34. See Freedom of Expression Association, “Joint Open Letter to Social Media Companies On Censorship in Türkiye,” 08.05.2025, https://ifade.org.tr/en/press-releases-announcements/joint-open-letter-to-social-mediacompanies-on-censorship-in-turkiye/ ↩

  35. Politico EU, “Meta faces ‘substantial’ fine for not complying with Turkey’s gag orders,” 01.04.2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/meta-turkey-gag-turkish-government-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu/ ↩

  36. Ibid. ↩

  37. Keskin Kalem Yayıncılık ve Ticaret A.Ş. and Others Application, App. No: 2018/14884, 27.10.2021. ↩

  38. Constitutional Court Norm Review Decision: Const. Court, Docket No. 2020/76, Decision No. 2023/172, 11.10.2023, O.G. 10.01.2024-32425. ↩

  39. LinkedIn was represented by SNPREP Danışmanlık Hizmetleri Anonim Şirketi, established in Türkiye, during the 2021–2025 period, but has recently begun to be represented by a real person. ↩