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Social Media Accounts Subjected to Legal Action

As of 2018, the Ministry of the Interior began regularly sharing with the public statistics on its monitoring activities directed at social media accounts. These data were published monthly from 2019 until 2024. The release of these data was discontinued as of 2024. Within that framework, content engaging in terror propaganda, praising terrorist organisations or declaring affiliation with them, inciting the public to hatred and enmity, insulting senior State officials, threatening the indivisible integrity of the State and the security of society, or containing hate speech, has been systematically tracked.

According to the data shared weekly throughout 2018, a total of 26.996 social media accounts were examined and legal proceedings were initiated in respect of 13.544 accounts. The figures given in the Ministry of the Interior’s statement of 31 December 2018, entitled “Operations Conducted Between 1 January and 31 December 2018”, were, however, expressed as higher numbers. According to that statement, in the same period 42.406 social media accounts were examined, and legal proceedings were initiated in respect of 18.376 persons.288

According to the data published monthly by the Ministry of the Interior throughout 2019, a total of 44.424 social media accounts were examined. Legal proceedings were reported to have been initiated in respect of 22.728 of these accounts.289 Different figures were, however, announced in the overall reporting conducted at the end of the year. According to data shared by the Ministry as of the end of 2019, 53.814 social media accounts were examined, and legal proceedings were initiated in respect of 24.224 persons, on grounds of content engaging in terrorist-organisation propaganda, praising such organisations or declaring affiliation with them, inciting the public to hatred and enmity, insulting senior State officials, or threatening the indivisible integrity of the State and the security of society.

Furthermore, following Operation Peace Spring, launched in October 2019, 1.297 accounts alleged to have made posts critical of the operation through social media were identified; within that framework 452 persons were detained, and 78 were arrested.290

In the course of 2020, 75.292 social media accounts were examined; legal proceedings were initiated in respect of 32.390 of those accounts; within that framework 2.397 persons were detained, and 77 were arrested. In the same year, 340.212 digital materials were examined, and from 15 July 2016 to the end of 2020 a total of 2.348.230 material examinations were carried out.291

In the 2020 Activity Report of the General Directorate of Security, it is reported that, within the framework of virtual-patrol activities, work was carried out in respect of 61.897 social media accounts in connection with subjects such as FETÖ/PDY, DAESH, the PKK, insulting senior State officials, narcotics, child abuse, payment systems, far-left organisations and illegal betting, and that the users of 30.091 accounts among them were identified and proceeded against.292

Moreover, in the same year, legal proceedings were initiated against 4.348 social media accounts under Law No. 6222 on the Prevention of Violence and Disorder in Sport. Finally, according to the Ministry of the Interior’s statement of 05.04.2020, in the course of the Covid-19 pandemic, 7.127 social media accounts were examined, 496 persons were detained, and 10 were arrested.293

In the course of 2021, 146.167 social media accounts were examined; legal proceedings were taken in respect of 60.051 of those accounts.294 A serious increase compared with 2020 was observed in the data announced by the Ministry of the Interior on monthly and yearly bases.

In the General Directorate of Security’s 2021 Activity Report, it is stated that, within the framework of virtual-patrol activities directed at content engaging in terrorist-organisation propaganda, encouraging narcotics, inciting the public to hatred and enmity, insulting the President, targeting the integrity of the State and committing offences against Atatürk (above all in respect of FETÖ/PDY, PKK/KCK, DAESH and far-left organisations), work was carried out on 106.808 social media accounts, and the users of 46.646 of those accounts were identified and reported to the judicial authorities.295

The data for 2022 show that the monitoring of social media has continued without abatement and shows a marked increase compared with previous years. According to the monthly and yearly data shared with the public by the Ministry of the Interior, in the course of 2022 a total of 188.689 social media accounts were examined and legal proceedings were reported to have been initiated in respect of 78.837 accounts. Within that framework, 1.787 persons were detained.

In addition, within the framework of the General Directorate of Security’s virtual-patrol activities, social media accounts that engage in “terrorist-organisation propaganda, sell or encourage narcotics, incite the public to hatred and enmity, glorify violence against women or animals, insult the President, share content directed against the integrity of the State or its institutions and commit offences against Atatürk (above all in respect of FETÖ/PDY, PKK/KCK, DEAŞ and far-left terrorist organisations)” were targeted.

Within that framework, in the course of 2022, 138.333 social media accounts were taken under surveillance, the users of 60.652 accounts were identified and reported to the judicial authorities, 917 persons were detained, 44 were arrested, a judicial control measure was applied to 162 persons, and 711 persons were released.296

In the course of 2023, unlike in previous years, the Ministry of the Interior shared neither monthly nor yearly statistical data on the examination of social media accounts with the public. In the course of preparing our 2023 report, the freedom-of-information request submitted under Law No. 4982 on the Right to Information also remained inconclusive. According to the 2023 Activity Report published by the General Directorate of Security, however, within the framework of virtual-patrol activities, a total of 172.795 social media accounts were taken under surveillance, in connection with content engaging in organisational propaganda, selling narcotics or encouraging their use, inciting the public to hatred, enmity and hostility, glorifying violence against women and animals, insulting the President, threatening the integrity of the State and the security of society, denigrating the Turkish nation, the Republic of Türkiye, the institutions and organs of the State, and committing offences against Atatürk (above all in respect of FETÖ, PKK/KCK, DEAŞ and far-left terrorist organisations); the users of 72.727 accounts were identified and reported to the judicial authorities. Within that framework, 1.302 persons were detained, 132 were arrested, a judicial control measure was applied in respect of 334 persons, and 836 persons were released.297

In addition to these data, following the Kahramanmaraş-centred earthquakes of 06.02.2023, 1.193 social media accounts were identified on the ground that they had “made provocative posts with the aim of creating fear and panic”; judicial proceedings were initiated against 746 account operators, 185 persons were detained, and 48 were arrested. This information was obtained from press statements made by the Ministry of the Interior.

According to the General Directorate of Security’s 2024 data, within the framework of virtual-patrol activities, a total of 198.364 social media accounts were taken under surveillance in connection with content engaging in organisational propaganda, encouraging the use of narcotics, inciting the public to hatred and enmity, glorifying violence against women and animals, insulting the President, threatening the integrity of the State and the security of society, and targeting State institutions and Atatürk (above all in respect of FETÖ, PKK/KCK, DEAŞ and far-left organisations). The users of 86.170 of these accounts were identified and reported to the judicial authorities. As a result of the proceedings conducted, 3.317 persons were detained, 384 were arrested, a judicial control measure was applied in respect of 879 persons, and 2.054 persons were released.298

According to the General Directorate of Security’s 2025 Activity Report, within the framework of virtual-patrol activities, a total of 257.481 social media accounts were tracked in connection with offences within the scope of organisational propaganda, sale or encouragement of narcotics, the offence of publicly inciting the public to hatred, enmity and hostility, violence against women and animals, insulting the President, threatening the indivisible integrity of the State and the safety of life of society, denigrating the Turkish Nation, the Republic of Türkiye and the institutions and organs of the State, and committing offences against Atatürk (above all in respect of FETÖ, PKK/KCK, DEAŞ and far-left terrorist organisations). The users of 162.298 accounts were identified and reported to the judicial authorities. As a result of the work conducted, 8.471 persons were detained, 496 were arrested, a judicial control measure was applied in respect of 1.360 persons, and 6.615 persons were released.299

Compared with previous years, the 2025 data openly reveal a systematic intensification. The number of accounts taken under surveillance rose from 198.364 in 2024 to 257.481, an increase of approximately 30 per cent. More striking still is the sharp rise in the number of accounts whose users were identified. That figure, which stood at 86.170 in 2024, reached 162.298 in 2025, an increase of approximately 88 per cent. The number of persons detained rose from 3.317 in 2024 to 8.471 in 2025, an increase exceeding 155 per cent. The number of persons arrested also rose from 384 to 496. These data show that the punitive surveillance mechanism over social media reached, in 2025, a scale exceeding that of all previous periods.

The most decisive event underlying this dramatic increase in 2025 was the detention, on 19 March 2025, of a total of 106 suspects, including the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Ekrem İmamoğlu. That operation was not confined to physical detentions; it also brought with it, on social media platforms and in particular on X (formerly Twitter), a simultaneous and systematic wave of digital pressure. The Minister of the Interior announced, following the detentions, that work had been initiated for the apprehension of persons making provocative posts within the framework of the offences of “inciting the public to hatred and enmity” and “inciting the commission of an offence”.300

As a result of the coordinated work of the Department of Cybercrime and the Department of Security, a total of 261 suspected account operators, 62 of them abroad, were identified, 37 of whom were apprehended. In its statement, the Ministry indicated that, from the time of the detentions until 06:00 on 20 March 2025, a total of 18.647.269 posts on the X platform relating to the subject had been identified. 66 per cent of those posts were stated to have come from named accounts, and 34 per cent from bot accounts. In a second statement made the following day, it was announced that 326 suspected account operators, 72 of them abroad, had been identified, and 54 suspects had been apprehended.301

This process is a concrete example of the systematic placement on a criminal foundation of social reactions expressed through social media, and of the investigation of users under vague and broadly interpretable categories such as “provocative posting”. The scanning of more than 18 million posts made after İmamoğlu’s detention and the identification within them of hundreds of accounts characterised as “suspect” shows just how quickly and comprehensively the State’s digital surveillance capacity can be mobilised to suppress public debate. Moreover, it was announced that at the demonstrations held on 20 March 2025, proceedings were taken against 53 persons for offences under Law No. 2911 (Law on Meetings and Demonstrations), damage to public property and resisting performance of duty, and that 16 police officers were injured. This confirms that the digital and the physical pressure mechanisms were activated simultaneously.302

Another important development of 2025 concerns the proceedings against social media in the course of the country-wide wildfires of July 2025. Between 1 and 28 July 2025, on the ground of the identification of “manipulative posts discrediting the works conducted for the extinguishing of the fires and targeting public institutions” in relation to the fires, proceedings were initiated against 13 account operators. The Ministry’s statement indicated that, in the same period, of 950.597 accounts posting on the X platform, 342.215 (36 per cent) were identified as bot accounts. Of a total of 3.375.499 posts, 2.330.000 (69 per cent) were assessed as negative and manipulative.303 The Minister of the Interior’s statement “We shall respond with gratitude to those who carry water to the fire and with the law to those who manipulate!” shows that even critical posts on natural disasters have been brought within the framework of criminal sanction.

Similarly, after the CHP Istanbul Provincial Headquarters was placed under a police cordon in Istanbul on 7 September 2025, alongside the bandwidth throttling applied for approximately 21 hours to the X, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal platforms, as stated in the General Directorate of Security’s press statement of 08.09.2025, on the assessment that “provocative and disinformation-related” posts had been made through certain social media accounts, 103 accounts, 16 of which were foreign-origin, were identified, proceedings were initiated against 39 persons, and 10 persons were detained.304

In the final days of the year, on 30 December 2025, following an operation against the DAESH terrorist organisation in Yalova, 16 persons making “provocative posts” through social media were apprehended.305

Ex Officio Investigations by the Public Prosecutors’ Offices Directed at Social Media Posts

Another notable development of 2025 is the marked intensification of the practice of public prosecutors’ offices of initiating ex officio investigations into social media posts. In particular, the offence of “Publicly Disseminating Misleading Information” under Article 217/A of the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237 has come to be applied by the prosecutors’ offices against social media users with an increasing frequency.

The Istanbul Anadolu Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated, throughout 2025, numerous investigations against social media users, which were announced to the public by press statements. Among these investigations are the apprehension in the province of Siirt and arrest of E.P., who was identified as the user of the X account under the handle “PiyasaTurkiye”, for the offences of Article 6 of the Anti-Terror Law (TMK) and breach of the privacy of individuals;306 the arrest of F.B. on the basis of Article 310 of the Turkish Criminal Code (Assassination of and Physical Attack upon the President), on account of his post directed at the President via X;307 and the blocking of access, under Article 217/A of the Turkish Criminal Code, to the X account identified by the handle “Ultimatom” (@ultimatoms) on the ground that it had been “continuously disseminating disinformation-laden information”.308

The Istanbul Public Prosecutor’s Office, for its part, announced that in the course of the investigation conducted into the allegations relating to the games-of-chance site “www.tuttur.com”, it had decided to arrest under Article 217/A of the Turkish Criminal Code Y.K., the user of the account identified by the handle @Pamenarti, who had raised these allegations through the X platform.309

The Bakırköy Public Prosecutor’s Office also initiated several ex officio investigations into social media posts in the course of 2025. Against A.U., an investigation was opened under Article 217/A of the Turkish Criminal Code for making, through his X account, a post contrary to fact, to the effect that the convicted person B.A. had been released;310 on 30 December 2025, an investigation was initiated under the same offence in respect of posts to the effect that “the perpetrator of the Istanbul Atatürk Airport attack had been released”.311

One of the most striking developments of 2025 is directly connected with the proceedings against Ekrem İmamoğlu. On 08.12.2025, in the hearing room located on the premises of the Marmara Penal Institution, while the proceedings of the defendant Ekrem İmamoğlu were continuing in the case file no 2025/381 E. of the Istanbul 59th Criminal Court of First Instance for the offence of forgery of an official document, on the understanding that an audio recording had been made unlawfully during the prosecution actions and had been shared on the X social media site, an ex officio investigation was initiated by the Bakırköy Public Prosecutor’s Office, Bureau of Organised Crime, under Article 286 of the Turkish Criminal Code, against the persons responsible for the recording and the transmission.312 This development is to be assessed as a concrete manifestation of the meeting of the public demand for transparency in judicial proceedings with criminal sanction, and of the effort to bring under control all digital traces around the İmamoğlu case.

The Istanbul Anadolu Public Prosecutor’s Office also issued a detention order on 15 July 2025 against a suspect who had made a comment of an insulting character on the X platform directed at a disabled veteran, under Article 216(2) of the Turkish Criminal Code (publicly inciting the public to hatred and enmity).313

Ministry of the Interior Social Media Examination Data (2018–2025)
Figure 29: Ministry of the Interior Social Media Examination Data (2018–2025)

While in the combined years 2018–2020, 146.712 social media accounts were examined, in 2021 alone 146.167 accounts were examined, and as of the end of 2021 the total number of examinations reached 292.879. The number of accounts in respect of which legal proceedings were taken by the end of 2021 was recorded as 128.723. With the 2022 data, this number rose to 481.568 examined accounts and 207.560 in respect of which legal proceedings were taken. By the end of 2023, a total of 654.363 social media accounts had been examined, and legal proceedings had been taken in respect of 280.287 accounts. According to the 2024 data, the number of accounts examined was 198.364, and the number in respect of which legal proceedings were taken was 86.170. Finally, with the 2025 data, 257.481 further accounts have been added to the number examined, and 162.298 further accounts to the number in respect of which legal proceedings were taken. Accordingly, between 2018 and 2025, a total of 1.110.208 social media accounts have been examined, and legal proceedings have been taken in respect of 528.755 accounts.

These data clearly reveal the steady increase, over the years, of the systematic monitoring of, and punitive approach toward, social media in Türkiye. The rise in the number of accounts examined is too political to be explained merely by the development of technical capacity. On the contrary, with social media gaining importance as a sphere of public debate, it shows that the administrative and criminal interventions conducted in the field of freedom of expression have become increasingly centralised and routinised. In particular, these practices, carried out on the basis of vague, elastic and broad concepts such as the fight against terrorism, have come to threaten not only individual rights but also the fundamental principles of a democratic social order.

In that respect, 2025 is in the nature of a turning point. The cumulative number of legal proceedings exceeding half a million, the annual detention figure of 8.471 persons, the scanning of more than 18 million posts following the detention of Ekrem İmamoğlu, and the spread of the practice of prosecutors’ offices opening ex officio investigations on account of individual social media posts, openly confirm that the digital sphere has been transformed into an environment of surveillance and obedience. In the face of these continuing oppressive practices, that judicial review has been largely rendered inoperative, and that no effective domestic remedy is offered against fundamental-rights violations, is also openly apparent both from the statistics and from the non-implementation of Constitutional Court judgments.

  1. See Ministry of the Interior, Operations Conducted Between 1 January and 31 December 2018 https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/1-ocak-31-aralik-2018-yili-icerisinde-yurutulen-operasyonlar ↩

  2. The Ministry of the Interior did not publish data for February and December 2019; for these two months, the average figures for the remaining ten months have been used within the scope of this study. ↩

  3. Press Release, “Coordination Meeting Held under the Chairmanship of Our Director-General of Security, Mr Mehmet Aktaş” (30.10.2019) https://www.egm.gov.tr/emniyet-genel-mudurumuz-sayin-mehmet-aktas-baskanliginda-koordinasyon-toplantisi ↩

  4. Anadolu Agency, “Ministry of the Interior Spokesperson Çataklı: 15 of the 17 Detained at the Boğaziçi Protests Are Not Boğaziçi Students” (05.01.2021) https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/icisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu-catakli-bogazicindeki-eylemlerde-gozaltina-alinan-17-kisiden-15i-bogazici-ogrencisi-degil/2098548 ↩

  5. See Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Security, 2020 Activity Report https://www.egm.gov.tr/kurumlar/egm.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/Planlama/2020_IDARE_FAALIYET_RAPORU.pdf ↩

  6. ibid. ↩

  7. Anadolu Agency, “Ministry of the Interior Spokesperson Çataklı: 1.140 Terrorists Neutralised in 2021” (04.01.2022) https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/icisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu-catakli-2021de-1140-terorist-etkisiz-hale-getirildi/2464934 ↩

  8. Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Security, 2021 Activity Report https://www.egm.gov.tr/kurumlar/egm.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/Planlama/2021_IDARE_FAALIYET_RAPORU.pdf ↩

  9. Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Security, 2022 Activity Report https://www.egm.gov.tr/kurumlar/egm.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/2022-EGM-Idare-Faaliyet-Raporu-.pdf ↩

  10. Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Security, 2023 Activity Report https://www.egm.gov.tr/kurumlar/egm.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/Planlama/EGM-2023-Yili-Idare-Faaliyet-Raporu.pdf ↩

  11. Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Security, 2024 Activity Report https://www.egm.gov.tr/kurumlar/egm.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/Planlama/EGM_2024_Yili_Idare_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf ↩

  12. Ministry of the Interior, General Directorate of Security, 2025 Activity Report https://www.egm.gov.tr/kurumlar/egm.gov.tr/IcSite/strateji/Planlama/2025_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf ↩

  13. Ministry of the Interior, Press Release No 2025-76, “37 Suspects Engaged in Provocative Posts Apprehended” (20.03.2025) https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/siber-suclarla-mucadele-daire-baskanligi-ve-guvenlik-daire-baskanliginin-yaptigi-koordineli-calismalar-sonrasi-37-supheli-yakalandi ↩

  14. Ministry of the Interior, Press Release No 2025-78, “326 Account Operators Identified for the Offences of Inciting the Public to Hatred and Enmity and Inciting the Commission of an Offence” (21.03.2025) https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/halki-kin-ve-dusmanliga-tahrik-ve-suc-islemeye-tahrik-suclarindan-326-hesap-yoneticisi-tespit-edildi ↩

  15. Ibid. ↩

  16. Ministry of the Interior, Press Release No 2025-240, “Proceedings Initiated Against 13 Persons Making Provocative Posts in Relation to the Wildfires” (28.07.2025) https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/yanginlarla-ilgili-provokatif-paylasim-yapan-13-kisi-hakkinda-islem-baslatildi ↩

  17. General Directorate of Security, Press Release of 08.09.2025 https://www.egm.gov.tr/08092025-tarihli-basin-aciklamasi-2 ↩

  18. Ministry of the Interior, Press Release No 2025-428, “16 Suspects Making Provocative Posts in Relation to the DAESH Operation in Yalova Apprehended” (30.12.2025) https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/yalovadaki-deas-operasyonuyla-ilgili-provokatif-paylasim-yapan-16-supheli-yakalandi ↩

  19. Istanbul Anadolu Public Prosecutor’s Office, Press Release Concerning the X User Identified by the Handle “PiyasaTurkiye” (07.11.2025) https://istanbulanadolu.adalet.gov.tr/istanbul-anadolu-cumhuriyet-bassavciliginin-piyasaturkiye-rumuzlu-x-kullanicisina-iliskin-basin-aci_120419 ↩

  20. Istanbul Anadolu Public Prosecutor’s Office, Press Release Concerning the X User Named Furkan Bölükbaşı (11.11.2025) https://istanbulanadolu.adalet.gov.tr/istanbul-anadolu-cumhuriyet-bassavciliginin-furkan-bolukbasi-isimli-x-kullanicisina-iliskin-basin-a_120831 ↩

  21. Istanbul Anadolu Public Prosecutor’s Office, Press Release Concerning the Account Identified by the Handle “Ultimatom” (@ultimatoms) (13.11.2025) https://istanbulanadolu.adalet.gov.tr/istanbul-anadolu-cumhuriyet-bassavciliginin-ultimatom-isimli-x-kullanicisina-iliskin-basin-aciklama ↩

  22. Istanbul Public Prosecutor’s Office, Press Release Concerning the User Identified by the Handle @Pamenarti (02.12.2025) https://x.com/istanbulCBS/status/1996076508394172486 ↩

  23. Bakırköy Public Prosecutor’s Office, Press Release Concerning A.U. (16.11.2025) https://x.com/BakirkoyCBS/status/1990107948878606582 ↩

  24. Bakırköy Public Prosecutor’s Office, Press Release Concerning the Allegations as to the Perpetrator of the Istanbul Atatürk Airport Attack (30.12.2025) https://x.com/BakirkoyCBS/status/2006055750485852179 ↩

  25. Bakırköy Public Prosecutor’s Office, Press Release Concerning the Sharing of an Audio Recording from the Ekrem İmamoğlu Proceedings (08.12.2025) https://x.com/BakirkoyCBS/status/1998045745698758887 ↩

  26. Istanbul Anadolu Public Prosecutor’s Office, Press Release Concerning an Insulting Comment Directed at a Disabled Veteran (15.07.2025) https://istanbulanadolu.adalet.gov.tr/istanbul-anadolu-cumhuriyet-bassavciliginin-x-sosyal-medya-sitesi-paylasimina-iliskin-basin-aciklam ↩